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Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) is a rapidly progressive condition involving
degeneration of both upper and lower motor neurons. Recent research suggests that
a proportion of persons with ALS show a profile similar to that of frontotemporal
dementia (FTD), with this group of ALS patients exhibiting social cognitive deficits.
Although social cognitive deficits have been partially explored in ALS, research has yet
to investigate such changes using ecologically valid measures. Therefore, this study
aimed to further characterize the scope of social cognitive and emotion recognition
deficits in non-demented ALS patients using an ecologically valid measure of social
cognition. A sample of 35 ALS patients and 30 age-and-education matched controls
were assessed using the Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination, the Brixton Spatial
Anticipation Test, and The Awareness of Social Inference Test, where participants were
required to discriminate between various emotions and decipher socially challenging
scenarios enacted in video vignettes. Participants with ALS showed significant difficulties
in recognizing both sarcastic and paradoxical sarcastic statements, but not sincere
statements, when compared to controls. After controlling for executive difficulties, ALS
patients still displayed significant difficulties on tasks that assessed their comprehension
of both sarcastic and paradoxical sarcastic statements. The inability to read social cues and
make social inferences has the potential to place significant strain on familial/interpersonal
relationships in ALS. The findings of this study highlight the importance of employing a
broader range of neuropsychological assessment tools to aid in early detection of frontal
lobe impairment in non-demented ALS patients.
Keywords: amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), frontotemporal dementia (FTD), social cognition, emotion
recognition, executive dysfunction
Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), the most common vari-
ant of motor neuron disease, is a rapidly progressive condition
involving degeneration of both upper and lower motor neu-
rons (Mitsumotot et al., 2005). The traditional assumption that
ALS spares cognitive function is now considered to be incorrect
(Strong et al., 2009; Phukan et al., 2012). Research consistently
reports functional and structural changes in the frontotemporal
region, manifesting as executive dysfunction, including behav-
ioral dysinhibition; a pattern of deficits similar to that observed
in frontotemporal dementia (FTD; Lomen-Hoerth et al., 2000;
Ringholz et al., 2005; Murphy et al., 2007; Meier et al., 2010;
Girardi et al., 2011).
Current formulations of executive functions recognize
them to be a distinct cognitive system that regulates other
cognitive processes. They include such cognitive constructs as
attention, working memory, multi-tasking, mental flexibility,
initiation/responsiveness, problem solving, verbal reasoning,
inhibition, and self-monitoring of one’s own behavior (Alvarez
and Emory, 2006). Studies (Abrahams et al., 2000; Gibbons et al.,
2007) examining executive dysfunction in ALS have employed
a wide range of assessment tools (i.e., verbal fluency, Wisconsin
Card Sorting Test). However, the administering of cognitive
measures is often problematic in ALS due to upper limb dysfunc-
tion and speech impairment (i.e., dysarthria and dysphagia), with
studies having to make adjustments to test administration, scor-
ing, and increasing the duration of time taken to complete such
tasks (Abrahams et al., 2000). In contrast a relatively newmeasure
of executive functioning, the Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test
(Burgess and Shallice, 1997), measures a person’s ability to detect
a rule, to follow it, and to switch to a new rule. This executive
task does not require a verbal or complex motor response by
the patient, and thus circumvents administrative issues faced by
researchers attempting to measure executive decline in ALS.
More recently, ALS research (Meier et al., 2010; Girardi et al.,
2011) has described a similar profile of deficits to that seen in
FTD,with ALS patients exhibiting changes in social cognitive abil-
ities. Gibbons et al. (2007) documented deficits on a Theory of
Mind (ToM) task, where individuals with ALS displayed reduced
ability to interpret cartoons and stories involving the comprehen-
sion of a character’s mental state (e.g., false beliefs and deception).
ALS patients exhibited profound impairments in deciphering
the social component of this task in addition to comprehending
humorous physical properties associated with the scene. It should
be noted that poor performance on the ToM task correlated with
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deficits on a measure of executive functioning (i.e., the Wisconsin
Card Sorting Task). Given that ToM tasks place strong demands
on frontal networks, the authors hypothesized that executive dys-
function may contribute or be solely responsible for the poor
social inferential and reasoning skills displayed within this ALS
sample.
Meier et al. (2010) recently investigated social cognitive deficits
in a small non-demented sample of ALS patients using the Faux
Pas test. This ToM task required ALS patients to determine
whether a character in a scenario had said something socially
inappropriate. This task has been found to be sensitive in corrob-
orating the presence of FTD and lesions in prefrontal networks
(Stone et al., 1998; Gregory et al., 2002). A large proportion of
this sample (9 of 18 patients) was unable to identify faux pas
elements when compared to controls. However, there were no
group differences on stories that did not contain faux pas com-
ponents. Contrary to Gibbons et al. (2007), after co-varying out
measures of verbal fluency, Meier et al.’s study found that exec-
utive dysfunction did not significantly impact performance on
social cognitive tasks. Similar findings were reported by Girardi
et al. (2011), who investigated ToM in ALS using a judgment pref-
erence task. This task required participants to infer the preference
of another by means of eye-gaze direction as a social cue. Results
of this study indicated that 64% of ALS patients were impaired on
the attentionally demanding condition (i.e., when the distractor
was present), while 36% performed poorly when the distractor
was absent. Error analysis revealed that a subset of patients dis-
played a lack of inhibition and an egocentric tendency to select
their own favored object while disregarding the one preferred by
the face in the task.
Research (Abrahams, 2011) suggests that intact emotion pro-
cessing is imperative to social cognition and perspective taking.
Deficits in emotion processing are well-recognized in FTD and
have been reported in ALS (Girardi et al., 2011). Studies have
noted that tests of emotion recognition are sensitive to FTD-like
pathology in ALS (Lillo et al., 2010; Woolley et al., 2011), how-
ever, research has produced mixed results. Deficits in emotion
prosodic speech recognition have been reported (Zimmerman
et al., 2007), however, these measures tend not to possess the dis-
criminatory properties of facial emotion recognition tasks. In a
recent study, ALS patients displayed deficits on two distinct mea-
sures involving the comprehension of simple (Facial Expressions
of Emotions test) and complex (Reading the Mind in the Eyes
test) displays of facial emotional expressions (Girardi et al., 2011).
While ALS patients performed worse than controls on tests of
emotion recognition, these differences were only marginally sta-
tistically significant, with the authors reporting that a subset of
five patients (four bulbar, one limb onset) performed within
abnormal ranges.
The static nature of social cognitive (e.g., Faux Pas test)
and emotion recognition measures (e.g., Facial Expressions of
Emotions Test) employed in ALS research to date fails to ade-
quately represent the non-artificial and dynamic scenarios that
are conveyed in real-world interactions, which encompass a com-
bination of multifaceted expressions of emotional, prosodic, and
facial morphology. The comprehension of sarcasm for instance, is
a complex process that requires the appreciation of both the latent
and actual content in order to evaluate both the facts surrounding
the scenario and the inferences made by the speaker (McDonald,
1999). Individuals with ventromedial and orbitofrontal lesions,
similar to regions implicated in social cognitive dysfunction in
ALS (Meier et al., 2010), have been reported to perform poorly
on tests of sarcasm recognition which has also been found to cor-
relate with a reduction in empathy and inferring affect (Shamay-
Tsoory et al., 2001). One may therefore anticipate similar deficits
in patients with ALS.
Research using “real-world” measure of social cognition [The
Awareness of Social Inference Test, (TASIT); see McDonald et al.,
2003], conveyed through video vignettes of actors making sincere,
sarcastic (e.g., a congruent statement relating to a specific event)
or paradoxically sarcastic statements (e.g., a seemingly true, yet
contradictory statement) has further characterized the scope of
social cognitive difficulties within specific clinical populations.
Studies have shown that patients with FTD and correspond-
ing frontotemporal atrophy on MRI (Kipps et al., 2009), and
semantic dementia (Rankin et al., 2009), display reduced ability,
relative to controls, in interpreting “real-world” sarcastic state-
ments on the TASIT. Analysis of imaging data from both studies
suggests that atrophy in the right lateral orbitomedial—temporal
lobe—amygdala network, but not orbitofrontal or dorsolateral
neocortical networks, are related to deficits in deciphering sar-
casm (Kipps et al., 2009; Rankin et al., 2009). As it stands, research
in ALS has yet to explore and characterize the nature of social
cognitive impairment by means of exploring the interpretation of
real-world social interaction (i.e., body language, paralinguistic
cues, and transient expressions of facial expression) and exam-
ine the potential impact that these impairments may conceivably
place on ALS patients and caregivers.
We investigated the ability of patients with ALS to use paralin-
guistic cues to aid in the interpretation sarcasm by employing a
real-world measure of social cognition. Unlike previous research
examining social cognitive deficits in ALS, the stimuli in the
present study are arguably more ecological than written sarcasm
stimuli, and may effectively incorporate affective paralinguistic
cues as to the speaker’s real intention. Compared to previous
studies that have employed static measures of social cognition,
the TASIT incorporates dynamic social exchanges that can be
considered more akin to real-life social situations. By employ-
ing such a tool, identified deficits may extrapolate more readily
to real-world social functioning, thus facilitating early diagnosis
and intervention with patients and their families.
The aim of this study was to add to the corpus of existing
knowledge and further characterize the extent of social cognitive
impairment in ALS by incorporating a more real-world mea-
sure of social cognition. It was hypothesized that non-demented
ALS patients would perform similarly to controls on tests of
basic emotion discrimination. It was also hypothesized that non-
demented ALS patients would performmore poorly than controls
in interpreting simple sarcastic and paradoxical sarcastic state-
ments, but not sincere statements. Lastly, it was hypothesized that
after controlling for difficulties on a task of cognitive flexibility
(i.e., The Brixton Spatial Anticipation Task), individuals with ALS
would still display significant difficulties in interpreting sarcastic
stimuli.
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METHOD
PARTICIPANTS
Participants were recruited from an Australian specialist mul-
tidisciplinary ALS clinic over a 10-month period, commencing
in 2011 and concluding in 2012. For inclusion in the study,
participants were required to have a diagnosis of clinically prob-
able or definite ALS, as defined by the El Escorial criteria
(Brooks et al., 2000). Participants with a past or present diag-
noses of other neurological and/or psychiatric disease, including
dementia or suspected FTD, were excluded, as were those with
a history of head injury, or other medical illness known to
affect central nervous system function. Non-English speakers or
those with significant hearing impairment were also excluded
from the study. Patients with ALS who had significant respi-
ratory involvement (FVC < 70%) were also excluded. A total
of 53 participants were initially recruited. Of these 53, 8 par-
ticipants declined/withdrew form the study citing personal rea-
sons. Of the remaining sample, 10 participants performed poorly
on the Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination Revised (i.e., two
standard deviations below the control group mean) and were
removed. A total of 35 non-demented participants with ALS
were included in the study. Thirty age-and education-matched
healthy controls were recruited via local community groups and
sporting clubs. The exclusion criteria for healthy control par-
ticipants were based on the criteria outlined above for ALS
patients.
Informed consent was obtained from all participants. Ethical
approval was obtained from the Calvary Health Care Bethlehem
and the La Trobe University Human Research Ethics Committees.
MATERIALS
ADDENBROOKE’S COGNITIVE EXAMINATION REVISED (ACE-R)
To facilitate recruitment of a non-demented ALS sample, all
participants completed the Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination
Revised (ACE-R; Mioshi et al., 2006), a brief cognitive
screening tool with good reliability. The ACE-R examines atten-
tion/orientation, memory, verbal fluency, language and visuo-
spatial abilities. Not all ALS participants were able to complete
all aspects of the ACE-R. As a result, the language and visuo-
spatial components of the ACE-R were modified to control for
individual variations in bulbar and upper limb control. On the
verbal fluency subtest, patients with ALS who were dysarthric
and needed to provide a written response, were given an extra
60 s to complete the subtest to ensure that they were not penal-
ized. This was a variation of the method employed by Abrahams
et al. (2000). The maximum possible score for the modified ACE-
R was 86. Given the study sought to include participants without
dementia, the ACE-R was utilized solely to screen for poor cog-
nitive performance. Participants were excluded from the study if
they performed below the conservative statistical cut off of two
standard deviations below the control group mean.
THE BRIXTON SPATIAL ANTICIPATION TEST
The Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test (Burgess and Shallice, 1997),
a rule attainment task consisting of 56 pages of an identical array
of ten circles, one of which is colored blue and changes loca-
tion based on a logical pattern. Subjects are shown one page at
a time, and are required to determine where the blue circle will
appear on the consecutive pages by attempting to see a pattern
or rule based on the information provided on the previous page.
The Brixton is a validated measure with good reliability, and does
not demonstrate hemispheric lateralization (Van den Berg et al.,
2009).
THE AWARENESS OF SOCIAL INFERENCE TEST (TASIT)
The Emotion Evaluation and Test of Social Inference (Minimal)
subtests from The Awareness of Social Inference Test (TASIT)
(McDonald et al., 2007) were used to assess comprehension of
basic emotion and the ability to detect speaker intention, atti-
tude, and meaning. The Emotion Evaluation subtest uses 14
professionally enacted video vignettes, with portrayals of positive
(happiness, surprise, and neutral) and negative emotions (anger,
disgust, fear, and sadness) lasting 10–20 s. Subjects were required
to state the emotion portrayed by one of the actors in the vignette
from a response card, which included the emotions in random
order. Patients were queried as to their understanding of each
emotion prior to commencing the task. Nine video vignettes of
actors making sincere, sarcastic or paradoxically sarcastic state-
ments were then shown to participants who were aware that they
would subsequently be asked to endorse or reject a series of state-
ments about what a specific actor was doing, saying, thinking, and
feeling. All vignettes were shown on a 15-inch computer screen,
with an attached loudspeaker system.
Examples of statements enacted by characters in video
vignettes of the Tasist, either in a Sincere, Sarcastic, or Paradoxical
Sarcastic tone is listed below.
Sincere Statement (conveyed in a congruent manner)
Ruth: “My sister is feeling really down. Would you mind if she
came to the mountains with is this weekend?”
Gary: “I don’t know why you have to ask. You know how I feel
about your sister.”
Ruth: “She really needs to get away.”
Gary: “Don’t we all. Why don’t we invite some other people as
also. What’s your mother doing this weekend?”
Ruth: “No. I just want my sister to come.”
Gary: “Come on, we can make a family weekend of it”
Sarcastic Statement (conveyed in a congruent statement relating to
a specific event)
Michael: “Well, congratulate me!”
Gary: “What for?”
Michael: “I’ve got a date with Anne.”
Gary: “Anne!”
Michael: “Come on, don’t be jealous.”
Gary: “Sure, I’m jealous.”
Paradoxical Sarcastic Statement (convey as a seemingly true, yet
contradictory statement)
Michael: “That was a massively long report you wrote. I could
hardly lift it.”
Ruth: “Yes, just a few brief notes.”
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Michael: “You poor thing. It must have taken you all weekend.”
Ruth: “Oh yes, I had a wonderful time. Just lying around,
resting up after a hard week.”
SYMPTOMS OF MOOD
Symptoms of mood disturbance were assessed using a modi-
fied version of the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS)
for ALS patients (Gibbons et al., 2011). In this modified ver-
sion, items pertaining to psychomotor activity were removed. The
modified HADS is a validated 12-item self-report questionnaire
with good reliability (Gibbons et al). Scores exceeding 9 indi-
cate the presence of anxiety and scores exceeding 8 indicate the
presence of depression.
FUNCTIONAL IMPAIRMENT
Functional impairment was assessed using the ALS Functional
Rating Scale-Revised (ALSFRS-R; Brooks et al., 2000), a validated
rating instrument for monitoring the progression of disability
in ALS which provides a physician-generated estimate of the
patient’s degree of functional impairment. Each item is rated on
a five-point scale, ranging from 0 to 4. Individual item scores are
summed to produce a reported score ranging from 0 to 40, with
higher scores indicating better functioning.
PROCEDURE
Demographic information including gender, age, education, and
past medical history was collected for all participants. For per-
sons with ALS, information regarding ALS onset and diagnosis
was also collected. ALS clinical phenotypes were determined by
the treating neurologist.
Patients with ALS completed the ACE-R, Brixton, TASIT and
the HADS. The ALSFRS-R was completed by the treating neurol-
ogist. All participation/data collection of ALS patients took place
during home visits.
Control participants completed the ACE-R, Brixton and
TASIT.
DATA ANALYSIS
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA
Demographic data were analyzed using analysis of variance
(ANOVA; basic cognition, age, education, gender, duration of
illness, anxiety, and depression).
TESTS OF NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL FUNCTIONING
The brixton spatial anticipation task
Between groups comparisons on a task of cognitive flexibil-
ity, as measured by scores on the Brixton, were analyzed using
ANOVA.
Scores on the emotion evaluation test
Due to sample size restrictions, between groups comparisons
amongst individual emotions were unable to be explored.
Therefore, Tasit emotion recognition scores were combined
to form two superordinate variables: positive (happy, surprised,
and neutral) and negative (anger, disgust, fear, and sadness)
which were then normalized to a maximum score of 1 per
item. Group means on emotion recognition were compared by
ANOVA.
Scores on the test of social inference (minimal)
Group differences on interpretation of sincere, simple sarcasm
and paradoxical sarcasm were analyzed using ANOVA. The dis-
tributions of scores on simple and paradoxical sarcasm were
negatively skewed and had to be reflected and natural-log trans-
formed to meet the assumption of normality for parametric
tests. Exploratory analysis between variables was carried out using
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA).
RESULTS
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS FOR ALS AND CONTROLS
PARTICIPANTS
There was no significant difference between ALS patients and
controls on a test of basic cognitive functioning as measured by
the modified ACE-R [F(1, 64) = 3.26, P ≥ 0.05]. There was no
significant difference in levels of education χ2 [1, (N = 65) =
0.165, P ≥ 0.05], gender χ2 [1, (N = 65) = 0.154, P ≥ 0.05], or
age [F(1, 64) = 0.147, P ≥ 0.05] between ALS and control par-
ticipants. Overall, ALS patients did not report high levels of
depression or anxiety. The average time of disease duration from
time of onset was 32 months—(please refer to Table 1).
TESTS OF NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL FUNCTIONING
The brixton spatial anticipation task
There was a significant difference between groups on the Brixton,
with ALS patients performing significantly worse on a task assess-
ing cognitive flexibility compared to controls [F(1, 64) = 16.74,
P < 0.05, η2 = 0.21].
Table 1 | Demographic data for group.
Variable ALS (N = 35) Controls (N = 30) P-Value
mean (SD) range mean (SD) range
Age (years) 63.51 (9.69) 62.63 (8.66) >0.05
Gender >0.05
Male n (%) 17 (48.6%) 10 (33.3%)
Female n (%) 18 (51.4%) 20 (66.7%)
Education >0.05
Incompleted high 7 (20%) 10 (33.3%)
school/trade n (%)
Completed high 9 (25.7) 5 (16.7%)
school n (%)
Completed tertiary 19 (54.3) 15 (50%)
education n (%)
Months since
symptom onset
32.05 (33.23)
ALSFRS 36.4 (8.97)
12–47
HADS Depression 3.52 (2.60)
HADS Anxiety 5.97 (3.42)
Note: ACE-R, Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination Revised; ALSFRS-R, ALS
Functional Rating Scale—Revised; HADS, Hospital Anxiety and Depression
Scale.
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Emotion discrimination—negative vs. positive emotions
Overall, there was no significant difference between ALS patients
and controls in their ability to recognize positive emotions
(happy, surprised, and neutral) [F(1, 64) = 0.759, P ≥ 0.05], or
negative emotions (anger, disgust, fear, and sadness) [F(1, 64) =
0.663, P ≥ 0.05] (please refer to Figures 1–7).
Test of social inference
There was no significant difference between ALS patients and
controls in the ability to recognize sincere statements [F(1, 64) =
1.75, P ≥ 0.05]. However, ALS patients displayed a signifi-
cant impairment in interpreting simple sarcastic statements
[F(1, 64) = 15.00, P ≤ 0.05, η2 = 0.19] and paradoxical sarcas-
tic statements [F(1, 64) = 16.26, P ≤ 0.05, η2 = 0.20] compared
FIGURE 1 | Standard error of the mean for ALS and Control
participants on Tasit Emotion Discrimination Happy.
FIGURE 2 | Standard error of the mean for ALS and Control
participants on Tasit Emotion Discrimination Surprised.
to healthy controls. Further analysis revealed no significant dif-
ference between ALS phenotypes (bulbar vs. limb onset) on
measures of interpreting simple sarcastic statements [F(1, 34) =
3.95, P ≥ 0.05], or paradoxical sarcastic statements [F(1, 34) =
0.32, P ≥ 0.05] (please refer to Figures 8–10).
To determine whether difficulties with interpreting simple sar-
castic and paradoxical sarcastic statements within the ALS group
were related to levels of executive difficulty, ANCOVA was con-
ducted. After controlling for executive difficulty as measured
by scores on the Brixton, results suggest that the ALS group
still performed poorly in interpreting simple sarcastic statements
[F(1, 64) = 10.35, P ≤ 0.05] and paradoxical sarcastic statements
[F(1, 64) = 8.74, P ≤ 0.05]—(please refer to Table 2).
FIGURE 3 | Standard error of the mean for ALS and Control
participants on Tasit Emotion Discrimination Neutral.
FIGURE 4 | Standard error of the mean for ALS and Control
participants on Tasit Emotion Discrimination Sad.
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FIGURE 5 | Standard error of the mean for ALS and Control
participants on Tasit Emotion Discrimination Angry.
FIGURE 6 | Standard error of the mean for ALS and Control
participants on Tasit Emotion Discrimination Anxious.
DISCUSSION
To our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate social cog-
nitive and emotion recognition deficits in non-demented ALS
patients using a measure of social cognition conveyed via video
vignettes. Consistent with previous research (Meier et al., 2010),
this non-demented cohort of ALS patients recruited from a spe-
cialist outpatient Motor Neuron Disease clinic showed evidence
of reduced cognitive flexibility. Relative to the age and educa-
tion matched control group, the ALS group performed signifi-
cantly worse on a task of cognitive flexibility (i.e., the Brixton
Spatial Anticipation Task) and tasks requiring individuals to make
higher order social inferences in the realm of sarcasm. However,
as expected the ALS group performed similar to controls on
FIGURE 7 | Standard error of the mean for ALS and Control
participants on Tasit Emotion Discrimination Revolted.
FIGURE 8 | Standard error of the mean for ALS and Control
participants on Tasit Social Inference Sincere Statement.
lower order tasks of basic emotion discrimination and making
inferences regarding sincere statements.
The ability to accurately discriminate and respond appropri-
ately to a range of emotion types is an important aspect of social
behavior that reinforces, guides and influences future actions. In
this study, the ALS group performed similarly to controls, dis-
playing an intact ability to accurately discriminate between a
range of positive and negative emotions. Previous research into
affect recognition in ALS has produced mixed results, with small
percentages of patients displaying significant difficulties in identi-
fying facial expressions of emotion (Girardi et al., 2011) or deficits
in emotional prosodic speech recognition (Zimmerman et al.,
2007; Meier et al., 2010). Given that past studies have employed
a wide range of stimulus modalities and tasks, this inconsis-
tent finding is not surprising. However, in this instance it can
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FIGURE 9 | Standard error of the mean for ALS and Control
participants on Tasit Social Inference Sarcastic Statement.
FIGURE 10 | Standard error of the mean for ALS and Control
participants on Tasit Social Inference Paradoxical Sarcastic Statement.
be said that this sample of ALS patients did not display deficits
in recognizing either positive or negative emotions relative to
controls.
In the current study, the ALS group did not display any diffi-
culty, relative to controls, in comprehending sincere statements.
While not comprehensively explored in previous ALS research,
this pattern of results has been found in other clinical groups
with frontal dysfunction, such as bvFTD (Kipps et al., 2009) and
Semantic Dementia (Rankin et al., 2009). Moreover, these find-
ings on the TASIT appear generally consistent with Meier et al.’s
(2010) results, where ALS patients displayed an inability to rec-
ognize faux pas elements within a story yet performed similarly
to controls when intentions were overtly obvious and did not
require interpretation of faux pas elements. Overall, it appears
that the present sample of ALS patients display intact ability to
Table 2 | Neuropsychological data for ALS and control participants.
Variable ALS Controls η2 P-Value
(N = 35) (N = 30)
mean (SD) mean (SD)
ACE-R 79.60 (3.64) 81.23 (3.61) >0.05
Brixton 20.02 (8.06) 13.43 (3.86)∗ 0.21 <0.05
EMOTION DISCRIMINATION
Positive emotions 4.40 (1.06) 4.6 (0.723) 0.012 >0.05
Negative emotions 6.77 (1.28) 7.00 (0.909) 0.01 >0.05
TEST OF SOCIAL INFERENCE
Sincere 8.94 (2.38) 9.66 (1.95) 0.027 >0.05
Simple sarcasmrnl 9.40 (2.46) 11.10 (1.32)∗ 0.192 <0.05
Paradoxical sarcasmrnl 9.82 (1.85) 11.23 (1.16)∗ 0.205 <0.05
Note: ∗p <0.05; rnl, median and interquartile range; Brixton, Brixton Spatial
Anticipation Test.
discern simple exchanges between individuals so long as they are
not overly complex.
Unlike the ability to interpret rudimentary social exchanges,
such as sincere statements, the ability to accurately and effectively
interpret higher levels of social cues, such as sarcastic exchanges,
requires an understanding of paralinguistic cues (McDonald
et al., 2003). The ability to appreciate and discern complex social
exchanges requires an individual to evaluate a situation using a
combination of multifaceted expressions of emotional, prosodic
and facial morphology, while at the same time having the social
nous to decipher the covert from overt within the social exchange.
In the current study, impaired performance on both sarcastic and
paradoxical sarcastic statements in this non-demented ALS group
was prominent. Findings such as these have been conveyed in past
research (Meier et al., 2010), where non-demented ALS patients
display intact cognitive function on general screening tools, how-
ever, display a reduced ability to make judgments and social
inferences on a host of tasks thought to be sensitive to social cog-
nitive impairment (Meier et al.). Kipps et al. (2009) reported that
individuals with FTD, and corresponding frontotemporal atrophy
on MRI, were significantly worse at deciphering sarcastic vs. sin-
cere statements on the TASIT. This profile of impairment strongly
suggests that a proportion of ALS patients do indeed display social
cognitive deficits similar to that reported in FTD.
Controversy remains regarding the precise role that executive
functions play in effectively deciphering socially challenging sit-
uations. In the current study, the ALS group performed worse
than controls on a test of executive functioning—once again con-
firming the presence of this widely reported cognitive hallmark
(Gibbons et al., 2008). However, after co-varying the effects of
executive difficulties out, the ALS group still performed poorly
when recognizing both sarcastic and paradoxical sarcastic state-
ments (that is, tasks tapping higher order social cognitive abili-
ties). This finding is consistent with Meier et al.’s (2010) findings,
where after co-varying out performance on an executive function
task (verbal fluency), participants with ALS were still impaired at
recognizing faux pas elements and making inferences based on
the scenario. Regardless, executive dysfunction in ALS strongly
suggests frontotemporal cortical involvement (Gibbons et al.,
2008; Hodges, 2008).
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The recent findings of Elamin et al. (2011) suggest that in
patients without dementia, the presence of executive dysfunction
is a negative prognostic indicator. The authors argue that compro-
mised executive functions may be a marker for a more aggressive,
and distinct form of ALS with a significantly shorter period of
survivorship. It seems likely that distinctive social cognitive pro-
cesses involve executive functioning to varying magnitudes. It
may be that the impact of executive functioning on social cog-
nitive processes can be conceptualized as facilitating, rather than
delineating, one’s ability to accurately decipher social cognitive
stimuli. In this instance, it can be argued that the difficulty exhib-
ited by persons with ALS in deciphering socially challenging
stimuli may in fact be related to compromised executive facul-
ties. The Brixton Spatial Anticipation Task purports to measures
a person’s ability to detect a rule, to follow it, and to switch
to a new rule. Such aspects of cognitive flexibility are essential
when interacting in social situations. In cases where individu-
als fail to utilize and impose such aspects of cognitive flexibility
in social scenarios, they are likely to encounter significant diffi-
culty when interpreting dynamic social exchanges, fail to process
information in a timely fashion and respond accordingly, exhibit
difficulty linking new information to prior knowledge, and expe-
rience frustration due to a lack of understanding of what has
transpired.
The current study did have a number of limitations. Although
this sample of ALS participants did not display impairments in
basic emotion recognition as measured by scores on the TASIT,
it is possible that the artificial nature of the videos vignettes
may have overly caricaturized emotional states in comparison
to natural expressions of emotions. Thus, a null finding may
have occurred when impairments were indeed present. However,
this null finding is consistent with the majority of the litera-
ture examining basic emotion discrimination in ALS to date. It
is also acknowledged that the lack of fine gradations of transient
expression of facial emotion and lack of incorporation of reaction
times may provide additional cues that facilitate basic emotion
discrimination. This does appear to be a consistent limitation
in the current ALS emotion recognition research and warrants
immediate attention.
This current study only employed a single measure of
executive functioning (i.e., Brixton Spatial Anticipation Task),
and as a result may have underestimated the relationship
that executive faculties play in deciphering socially challeng-
ing content. By employing a wider range of executive tasks
in this current study, we may have uncovered a direct rela-
tionship amid social cognitive deficits and executive functions.
However, selecting an appropriate host of executive measures
that circumvent both speech and physical limitations when
conducting research with ALS population continues to be
challenging.
Furthermore, we acknowledge that using the modified ACE-R
to aid in screening for cognitive impairment was a limitation in
this study. However, given the difficulty of conducting cognitive
assessments within a population that suffers from speech diffi-
culties and/or upper limb dysfunction, the use of this measure
to facilitate the exclusion of participants with reduced cognitive
functioning was necessary.
In summary, the key findings of this study indicate that non-
demented ALS patients displayed deficits in deciphering sarcastic
and paradoxical sarcastic statements which are thought to be
related to cortical degradation in the orbitofrontal and/or dor-
somedial prefrontal regions (Meier et al., 2010). While research
(Abrahams et al., 2005; Gibbons et al., 2008) has reported that a
proportion of ALS patients develop frontal lobe dementia which
ultimately results in profound behavioral dysinhibition and exec-
utive dysfunction, the recognition that subtle alterations in these
cognitive functions present in a proportion of non-demented ALS
patients has now been recognized (Meier et al., 2010). While not
yet specifically documented in ALS, autism research has ascribed
high-level social cognitive deficits as leading to reduced respon-
siveness to others and a lack of social and emotional reciprocity
(Chevallier et al., 2012). This lack of social perceptiveness and
reciprocity is especially poignant in ALS, where social relation-
ships become paramount in the context of reduced speech and
severe physical disability.
The inability to read social cues and effectively communi-
cate has the potential to place significant amounts of strain on
familial/interpersonal relationships. This is especially true for ALS
carers who are placed under large amounts of stress due to the
physically debilitating nature of the disease (Gordon et al., 2007).
It is highly likely that as alterations in social cognition become
more prominent, ALS patients will experience difficulties in being
able to engage in a wide range of activities that, in turn, reduces
their quality of life. Therefore, the detection of subtle alterations
in cognition amongst ALS patients in early stages of the disease is
paramount to inform future decision-making and advanced care
planning.
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